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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to compare the employment of tactical Command Posts in
the U.S. and Soviet armies. In both the U.S. concept of AirLand Battle and the Soviet
doctrine of Offense in Depth, the Command Post is the facility from which command and
control is exercised. Therefore, understanding its characteristics, functions, and structure
are of great importance. In pursuit of that understanding, this paper provides definitions
for the fundamental concepts of command and control, and the Soviet counterpart, troop
control. These definitions are then applied to a model for the management of military
forces. The warfighting doctrine of each army is then reviewed with special emphasis on
how the doctrine impacts on the functions of management. Finally, a detailed examination
of Command Posts explores whether they adequately support C2 needs, based on the
warfighting doctrine. The principal conclusion is that there exists a dire need for the U.S.
to clearly and distinctly define the concept of a C2 process in order to gain an
understanding of how CPs fit into the C2 picture.
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A world is supported by four things. ...The learning of the wise, the justice of the
great, the prayers of the righteous, and the valor of the brave. But all of these are as
nothing without a ruler who knows the art of ruling.
Frank Herbert, Dune
The nature of the ground battlefield has changed dramatically in recent years.
Advanced weapons systems, characterized by increased range, mobility, and lethality;
improved intelligence methods in the form of better sensor devices; faster, more reliable
communications; more precise target acquisition methods; and new warfighting doctrines
for both the U.S. and Soviet Armies have combined to make today's battlefield both a
highly complex and very deadly environment. As a result, the nature of command and
control in supporting the ground combat commander must adjust to meet the demands
placed on it.
Today's command and control system must facilitate control by providing the
commander with the means to seize opportunities to gain and maintain the initiative. It
must extend the full depth of the battlefield. It must provide speed and flexibility such that
the commander can bring combat power to bear at critical points. Finally, the C2 system
must simultaneously support the planning and conduct of actions across the entire depth of
battle, as well as support the interoperability requirements needed to ensure coordinated
operations of air, ground, and sea forces.
These myriad requirements put a terrible strain on the C2 system. First, by stretching
the limits of the maximum ranges of communications equipment. Second, the need for
timely and accurate information increases the strain on the C2 system. Third, the
operational area of command post coverage is greatly extended. And finally, the span of
control exercised by commanders, staff officers and leaders at all levels increases.
C2 synchronizes and coordinates combat power on the battlefield and provides
direction to the forces. The C2 system provides the framework through which the
commander communicates his intent to subordinates and supervises the execution of his
plan. In order to accomplish this, the command and control system consists of three
components:
* The C2 organization—commander and staff
* The C2 process—facilitation of the flow of information that effectively supports the
control process
* The C2 facilities-command posts and communication system
This paper will discuss a portion of the C2 facilities: the command post. The purpose
of this thesis is to examine, compare, and contrast the doctrine for tactical CPs in both the
U.S. and Soviet ground forces. To accomplish this, a general model of military
management will be discussed. This is followed by a description of current U.S. and
Soviet warfighting doctrine^, and the implications of this doctrine on the respective force's
C2 system. The study concludes with an in-depth description and comparison of the
doctrine, structure, and employment of CPs in the two Armies, and an evaluation of how
these CPs fit the warfighting doctrine and the military management model.
A close examination of command posts is an important exercise for a number of
reasons. The CP is where a force commander exercises command. It is the location from
which the leader controls his forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The traditional
image of the field marshall standing on a hilltop overlooking the field of battle, monitoring
^The expression "warfighting doctrine" is U.S. terminology only. It has been used in this context to
describe the concept of battle operations for both the U.S. and Soviet forces. This is legitimate for U.S.
forces, but "military doctrine" in the Soviet Union has an entirely different meaning than as used here. Use
by this author of the expression is for simplicity and convenience.
the progress of his plan, has given way to technology and changes in the size of the
battlefield. The "hilltop" of today is the command post. Understanding the structure,
organization, and tasks of the CP is a crucial step in defining a command and control
process. Only through a clear understanding of the process can truly effective command
and control be provided.
A. DEFINITIONS
The comparison between any aspect of Soviet and American society is made difficult
by a number of factors, not the least of which is the language difference. English
translations of Soviet military writings must be examined with the context of the original
writing in mind. In the case of this particular paper, the problem is exacerbated by the fact
that English translations are being reinterpreted (by this author) and compared to writings
of U.S. doctrine and definitions which are also being interpreted. The result is a third
generation understanding of Soviet concepts being compared to (and thought in terms of) a
set of second generation understanding of U.S. concepts. Further aggravating this
problem, particularly for this subject area, is the irregular use of C2 terminology in the
U.S. Terms such as "management," "decision making," and "command and control" are
used in many different contexts and are, therefore, difficult to define with precision, and
even more difficult to compare to Soviet concepts.
With this in mind, the first step of this paper will be to draw a rough comparison
between the definition of a familiar U.S. term and the Soviet concept that can be considered
its counterpart. There are more definitions of commonly used terms (both U.S. and
Soviet) applicable to the general subject of command and control, and specifically to
command posts in Appendix A. However, to study command posts, it is necessary to
consider the fundamental framework within which they exist. This framework in the U.S.
scheme is Command and Control (C2) and for the Soviets is Troop Control.
1. Command and Control
For years, U.S. military leaders and academics have struggled with
understanding and defining the concept of command and control. Presently, the
Department of Defense does have a working definition:
...the exercise of authority and direction by an appointed commander over assigned
forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control tasks are performed
through a collection of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating,
and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of that mission. [Ref. 11
The important principles in this definition are the accomplishment of the mission
and the reference to, or implication of, a command and control system or structure (the
collection of personnel, equipment, etc.) that the commander uses to accomplish that
mission. The reference to specific management functions (planning, directing,
coordinating, and controlling) that are performed as a part of the command and control
process is also a key point.
It is important to remember that the "...only purpose of command and control is
to implement the commanders will in pursuit of the unit's objective." [Ref. 2:p. 7-3]
Command and control, then, is a commander using resources in a system to control his
subordinates in order to accomplish a mission.
2. Troop Control
The Soviet counterpart to command and control is dependent upon the size and
mission of the unit or weapon system that is under consideration. A simplistic view of this
dependency is that for large scale actions (at the operational level) and for units equivalent
in size to regiment or higher, the Soviets exercise troop control. For smaller actions and
headquarters down to the individual weapon system, they think in terms of control of
combat means (see Appendix A).
Troop control is defined as:
...the activity of commanders of operational level and tactical level units, chiefs, staffs,
political organs, services, and other control elements on maintaining constant combat
readiness and the fighting capability of their own troops, preparing operations and
tactical actions, and directing troops for the carrying out of assigned missions. It
includes:
(1) continuous receipt, collection, study, representation, and analysis of data
concerning the situation
(2) making a decision about the operation (tactical action)
(3) disseminating missions to subordinate troops
(4) planning the operation (tactical action)
(5) organizing and maintaining mutual support
(6) preparing troops and staffs for combat operations and guiding them directiy
(7) organizing and carrying out measures dealing with party-political work and
all forms of combat support
(8) organizing the monitoring of and giving assistance to commanders of
subordinate operational level units, staffs, and troops. [Ref. 3:p. Ill]
The Soviets emphasize the importance of the commander in the troop control
process, to the point of saying troop control is an activity of the commander. The mention
of the mission to be accomplished in the definition is also a key aspect of the process.
Specific activities mentioned in this definition will be further studied in Chapter II, a
discussion of military management, and in Chapter IV, an examination of Soviet CP
doctrine. The key characteristics of the Soviet definition of the troop control process are its
centralized nature, the importance of the plan and goals of the operational commander, and
the distinct reference to the need to accomplish certain (specific) management tasks.
The Soviets also include a great deal of emphasis on the role of the staff in this
entire process. The staff is the means through which the commander exercises troop
control. This is done by the planning, organizing, and regulating actions of the staff
Troop control, then, can be described as a commander exercising control over his
subordinates through the actions of his staff toward the accomplishment of a mission.
B. SUMMARY
The similarity between the U.S. concept of command and control and Soviet troop
control is clear. The focus is on accomplishing a mission, and the central point of the
concept is the unit commander. The management functions of planning, coordinating,
organizing, and regulating (directing) are mentioned in both definitions. But there are also
differences. The first and most obvious is that the Soviet development of a working
definition of the process is more complete in that it is much more detailed and specific than
the U.S. definition. (This does not mean they are more effective nor that they are better
fighters.) Troop control does not specifically discuss the facilities that go into the
command and control process where the U.S. definition does (although the Soviets do so
in an indirect fashion for security reasons). Also the Soviet view is actually more
concerned with the concept as a process than the U.S. We have a tendency to emphasize
the hardware and equipment of the system, rather than the process by which it functions.
The Soviets also place much more emphasis on the role of the staff, describing in detail
how staff activity supports the commander in the accomplishment of the mission.
II. MANACxEMENT
If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly
understood, the General is to blame. But if his orders are clear and the soldiers
nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
The continuing increases in the lethality and complexity of modem ground warfare
requires, more than ever, the efficient application of combat forces. In warfare, the
effectiveness of available men and equipment must be maximized. In order to maximize the
efficient use of these resources, precise, orderly, and well thought out management
principles must be applied. Management, therefore, must be an orderly business. In the
absence of systematic management means, a leader is lost. With this in mind, this chapter
will present a general model for management of military forces.
A . MILITARY MANAGEMENT MODEL
A philosophy of management is a system of general principles that may serve as a
basis to solve practical problems. The management process of an Army is how
commanders and staffs do their work. Whether the work is administrative, logistical,
tactical, or operational; whether it involves a squad leader or a division commander; the
efforts of men and organizations and the employment of equipment must be systematically
managed. Management applies to all levels of command and leaders at each level must
ensure that the basic functions of management are carried out within their organization.
There are analogous "functions of control" in the Soviet military. The Soviet word for
control (upravleniye) corresponds to this use of management. These management
functions are [Ref. 4:p. 69]:
* Planning--determination of WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, and HOW
* Organizing-establishing relationships between functions, men and materials
* Coordinating--integrating of the details of a plan
* Directing-communicating to subordinates the leader's intent
* Controlling--ensuring that directives are properly carried out
Prior to discussing each of these management functions in more detail and
subsequently applying the model to the command post doctrine of U.S. and Soviet ground
forces, it is necessary to agree that this model is an applicable description of the
management process in the two armies.
There are a number of different management paradigms. Each attempts to describe the
processes exercised by the manager in accomplishing a task. The specific descriptions
naturally differ, but from a broad perspective, the five functions listed above adequately
describe the activities of a manager. While the tasks of planning and organizing seem to be
virtually universal in management theory, the other terms do not enjoy the same popular
acceptance. "Commanding," "regulation of execution," "delegating," communicating," and
"monitoring" are all terms that have been substituted for the last three functions.^ It is less
the terminology and more the description of the process that is important, however, and the
description in most management models is similar to that which follows. Therefore, the
reader can accept the assumption that this model is an applicable paradigm of the man-
agement process exercised by U.S. and Soviet ground force commanders.
^The references to other terms to describe the management/control process points out a significant weakness
in U.S. command and control theory. This weakness is that there is really no clear-cut, definitive
description of the command and control process for U.S. forces. There are numerous descriptions of the
management process in a general sense (see Bibliography) and some investigation as to how this
management is affected by military combat operations, but it is very difficult to find documentation
describing what the command and control process really is, how it is accomplished, and the implications of
the process on other fields (such as research and development, material acquisitions, automation, and so on).
8
1. Planning
Planning can be described as the process of selecting the best course of action to
complete a task in the least time, and with the least expense. It consists of deciding WHAT
must be done, WHERE to do it, WHEN to do it, HOW it will be done, and WHO will do
it. Steps in the planning process include gathering information, preparing this information
for its use, and developing instructions for action. Planning is always the fu-st step in the
management cycle. It will most likely continue throughout the other functions, but it will
(hopefully) always precede action. All meaningful activity in a military organization is the
result of some sort of plan. Planning is how an organization moves from the present to the
future in order to accomplish its mission. The mission is what provides the purpose to the
planning process. This process consists of three steps. These are: forecasting, the phase
that occurs prior to receipt of a specific mission, and is an evaluation of facts and trends;
estimating, which is the logical approach used to solve the specific problem; and the final
step, plan preparation. The prepared plan is how a decision gets translated into action, and
can take any form from an operations order to a verbal instruction. Regardless of the form
of a plan, it must be clear, concise, understandable, and realistic in order to be effective.
2. Organizing
This is the process of uniting work, worker, and workplace in a manner that will
get the mission accomplished the most efficiently. Organizing establishes relationships
between activities, establishes procedures and policies for accomplishing certain tasks, and
allocates resources. Responsibilities are assigned during the organizing phase of the
management cycle. Tasks are determined based on the requirements of the plan. Then a
structure is established, grouping units and individuals to best accomplish the tasks.
Finally, the tasks are assigned to the individuals and units. Equipment, space, time, skills,
and other resources are then provided, so the tasks can be carried out.
3. Pirgcting
Directing is the process of getting people to perform their jobs well, willingly,
and quickly. It is synonymous with leadership. The most important element to effective
direction is clear communications. Characteristics of good directives are clarity,
completeness, brevity, simplicity, and timeliness. Direction is the key link in the
management chain.
4. Coordinating
The purpose of coordination is to get cooperation between all the participants in
an activity. Some degree of coordination is required in all phases of management.
Coordination seeks the integration of all details necessary for mission accomplishment. It
is effective if all agencies concemed with an operation are brought in with a minimum of
effort.
5. Controlling
Controlling is the process of insuring that everything is done according to the
plan that has been established, using the procedures and policies that are accepted or agreed
upon. Controlling involves both checking actual results against the desires of the manager
and taking corrective action when needed. If control is exercised by all levels of a
command during all phases of a mission, corrective action can be minimized. Control
requires the establishment of standards to which the outcome is compared, as well as a
control means, such as reports or inspections. Control is the way a manager is provided
feedback, and is the stimulus that causes the next planning phase. Performing the function
of control is where the command post plays its role in the tactical scheme of things.
B. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter is to present a simple model to describe the activities of a
military manager. The five functions of military management are identified as planning.
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organizing, ccx)rdinating, directing, and controlling. Each of these functions was briefly
described. These descriptions are important as they will be used in Chapter IV to discuss
activities at command posts, and to evaluate if the command post doctrine adequately
matches the C2 (or troop control) process to the operational need.
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III. RATTT.EFTELD DOCTRTNE
A combat leader can be almost assured that, once he has issued a directive for his unit
to carry out a mission, something will interfere with that operation— at some time and to
some degree.
Col. Samuel H. Hays
In order to understand the command post, it is necessary to be familiar with the context
within which the command post exists. In other words, to be able to evaluate if the CP
doctrine is designed effectively to support a military operation or action, it is important to
understand the operational doctrine that governs the military force. For the U.S., this
operational doctrine is the AirLand Battle. The Soviet Army operates under the concept of
the Offense in Depth. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief review of the salient
features of these two warfighting concepts, and to discuss the ramifications each has on the
command and control (troop control) system that is designed to support it.
A. AIRLAND BATTLE
In response to the changing nature of combat, the U.S. Army must be prepared to
meet a variety of situations and challenges. The modem fighting environment can range
from a sophisticated battlefield with well established communications, logistics, air
defense, etc., to an unsophisticated battiefield with virtually no infrastructure. The Army
could be fighting an enemy of light, well-equipped insurgents, or highly mechanized forces
typical of the Warsaw Pact. The next war is likely to be intense, deadly, and costiy. To
win, U.S. forces must coordinate all available military assets in pursuit of common
objectives. We must seize and retain the initiative, and disrupt the enemy in depth with
deep attacks, effective firepower, and decisive maneuver. AirLand Battle is the Army
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doctrine to meet these challenges [Ref. 2]. This section will briefly review the concepts of
AirLand Battle, and its implications on the command and control system.
AirLand Batde attempts to develop the full potential of U.S. forces through operations
based on nonlinear battles which attack enemy units throughout their depth with fire and
maneuver. These operations require coordination of all available military forces in pursuit
of a single objective. Maneuver forces, both air and ground; conventional, unconventional,
and nuclear or chemical fires; active reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition;
and electronic warfare will be directed against the enemy. U.S. forces must retain the
initiative, and with deep attack and decisive maneuver, dominate the battlefield. By
extending the battlefield and integrating combat means, enemy vulnerabilities can be
exploited anywhere.
At the base of the AirLand Battle operational concept are the principles of war (see
Appendix B). The doctrine is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it
aggressively to defeat the enemy. Defeat is achieved by throwing the enemy off balance
with powerful blows from unexpected directions, and rapid follow up to prevent his
recovery. Initial blows are struck against critical units and areas whose loss will degrade
the coherence of enemy operations. Army units will attack the enemy in depth,
synchronize all efforts, and maintain the agility necessary to shift forces to capitalize on
enemy weaknesses. Our operations must be violent, unpredictable, and disorienting to
enemy units. Planning must be precise enough to preserve combined arms concepts, yet
flexible enough to allow response to opportunity. Success will depend on the basic tenets
of AirLand Battle doctrine: initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization (see Appendix A).
This requires that the entire force understand the commander's intent, a task for the
command and control system.
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AirLand Battle emphasizes the dynamics of battle, or the interaction of the factors that
decide battle outcome. It is necessary to understand combat power, the combination of
maneuver, firepower, and protection by a skillful leader in the context of a sound plan.
Applied at the decisive place and time, combat power decides the batde.
Success in battle also depends on application of the factors of mission, enemy, terrain,
troops, and time available (METT-T). The effectiveness of combat power depends on how
the commander combines operational procedures, battie drills, or other measures to solve a
problem. In the AirLand Batde, the commander must understand and apply the seven
combat imperatives [Ref. 2:p. 2-6]:
* Insure unity of effort
* Direct friendly strength against enemy weakness
* Designate and sustain the main effort
* Sustain the fight
* Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly
* Use terrain and weather
* Protect the force
In execution, the AirLand Batde may mean using every element of combat power. The
batdefield includes every area and every enemy unit that can affect the outcome, and
extends into the area of interest where future operations will take place. AirLand Battle
doctrine concentrates on indirect approaches, speed and violence, flexibility and reliance on
the initiative of junior leaders, rapid decision making, clearly defined objectives and
operational concepts, a clearly designated main effort, and the deep attack.
1. The Implications
Command and control refers to the exercise of command, the means of planning
and directing battles. Its essence is applying leadership, making decisions, issuing orders.
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and supervising operations. The system that does these things in the AirLand Battle must
be reliable, secure, fast and durable. It must collect, analyze, and present information
rapidly and efficiendy. It must communicate orders, coordinate support, and provide
direction in spite of electronic interference, destruction of command posts, or loss or
replacement of commanders.
Opportunities on the contemporary battlefield will arise and pass quickly.
Subordinate leaders must exercise initiative within the context of the commander's concept.
Staff coordination and assistance are indispensible.
The key measure of effectiveness for a command and control system is whether
it functions more accurately and quickly than the enemy's. The AirLand Battle provides
infinite challenges to the C2 system. Effective operations depend on its superiority.
The fast pace of the battlefield and the constant changes to the tactical situation
will require a high volume of information flow in order to keep the commander informed.
This is necessary in order to take advantage of opportunities as they arise. Information
flow will be very time sensitive as a result of the fast pace, requiring a responsive and
durable command and control system. Since the entire force must understand the
commander's concept (to allow for initiative at lower levels) where the information flows is
also a critical factor. The command and control structure must be able to get the right
information to the right place at the right time.
As the commander goes through his management process, the command and
control system must be able to provide the means to accomplish that process. To plan, he
must have information, which is gathered, analyzed and presented by the C2 system. As
he decides on an organization, the elements involved in that organization must be made
aware of the situation. Coordination and direction are possible only as a result of the
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effectiveness of the C2 system. Controlling the force cannot be done if the commander's
C2 system does not keep him in contact with the force.
Communications plans must include a contingency to compensate for rapidly
changing priorities as battle intensity shifts. The execution of the AirLand Battle doctrine
requires skillful use of all assets, meaning extensive cooperation and coordination are
necessary. These are the functions of the C2 system. The nonlinear view of battle dictated
by AirLand Battle doctrine makes it imperative that communications planners and
communicators consider the deep, near, and rear battles as one, requiring a complete unity
of effort.
A wide range of surveillance and target acquisition sensors and improved C3
capabilities are required to support AirLand Battle. With the staggering amount of
intelligence and targeting information collected, it must be properly focused at the correct
echelon. There must be close coordination of all phases of the batde. Commanders and
staffs must exchange combat information freely to ensure its timely exploitation. The key
to success is the close integration of combat forces involved in the AirLand Battle.
The AirLand Battle has significant impact on the management functions
described in Chapter IL Certainly the complexity of the modem battlefield requires
detailed, specific planning and a clearly defined organizational breakdown of tasks and
responsibilities. Additionally, the rapid tempo and unstable environment make in-depth
coordination between staffs and subordinate commanders very difficult. Providing concise
and timely direction to subordinates is another task challenged by the nature of the




This section has briefly described the U.S. Army concept of operations on the
modem battlefield. The nature of AirLand Battle doctrine has a profound impact on the C2
system. The requirement for a responsive, reliable, secure, timely, accurate command and
control system is made more critical by the fact that the characteristics of today's combat
make the functions of the C2 system much more difficult to accomplish. Furthermore, the
functions of management are integral factors to success in the AirLand Battle, yet this
doctrine makes those very tasks extremely difficult.
B . OFFENSE IN DEPTH
In order to evaluate whether the Soviet use of CPs fits into their troop control
architecture, a very brief review of their doctrine of military operations is necessary. This
doctrine is known (translated) as the Offense in Depth [Ref. 51. It should be noted that this
discussion refers only to Soviet conventional doctrine. While they include the use of
nuclear weapons in their warfighting strategy, the control process involved is separate from
the tactical level troop control, and is not discusses in this paper.
As the military capabilities (specifically the range and mobility of fire support in the
form of artillery and aviation) of the Soviet Union's adversaries increased, the Soviets
realized the need to reevaluate their doctrine. Enemy weapons that were located well away
from the FEBA were now a significant threat and had to be engaged with the same
decisiveness as closer targets. At the same time, Soviet capabilities also improved. Their
fire support systems had better range, and armor and infantry forces were much more
mobile.
The Soviet conclusion to these new battlefield characteristics was that a combined arms
effort is required. Success in combat can be attained through simultaneously attacking the
entire depth of the enemy defenses. Artillery bombardment and airstrikes in the rear,
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coupled with massive tank and infantry formations along the front will develop
breakthroughs that can be rapidly exploited. Enemy command and control facilities, lines
of communications, and logistics support can then be disrupted and the remainder of the
front isolated, leaving and enemy unit disorganized, demoralized, and defeated.
The separate arms and services must combine their efforts under a single control
element in the implementation of a unified plan. To be executed successfully, this
combined arms force must maintain a rapid tempo of advance characterized by speed,
flexibility, and aggressiveness. Opportunities must be created and advantages built upon.
To this end, the Soviets developed the practice of force echelonment.
* THE FIRST ECHELON. Typically, the first (assault) echelon attacks and penetrates
enemy forward defenses. This force will attempt to strike weak points in the defense
and drive to the enemy's rear whenever possible by bypassing major force
concentrations. The first echelon will normally be comprised of combined arms
units, typically a motorized rifle division, but a tank division can be used if the
situation requires it.
* THE SECOND ECHELON. This element of the Soviet forces will normally consist
of up to half of the total force. It will probably be heavily armored (tank units), but
the specific size and composition will depend on the tactical situation. This force
will have the mission of reduction of bypassed enemy forces, exploitation of the
penetration achieved by the first echelon, an attack in a new direction, continuing the
first echelon attack deeper into the enemy rear, or replacement or reinforcement of
the first echelon if it suffered heavy losses.
* THE OPERATIONAL MANEUVER GROUP. This force is designed to move
faster and go deeper. It will be a high speed, predominately tank unit. It will
normally provide a supporting attack along a different axis than the main advance.
The OMG will probably be used early in an operation, and will have specific
objectives in the enemy near, such as airfields, nuclear weapons reserves, or political
or economic centers.
The Soviet principles of military art (see Appendix C) are the fundamental theory that






* Massed forces at the right place and right time
These characteristics manifest themselves as certain features that are found on the
modem battlefield. These features include:
* The need for decisive action
* Very high maneuverability
* Rapid changes in the situation
* Uneven development across the depth of the batdefield
1 . The Implications
All of this results in a critical need for a well coordinated and orchestrated
operation. The coordination must be across all arms and services involved in the combat,
including tank, artillery, aviation, and infantry forces. The need for thorough and
continuous coordination throughout the planning and execution of this type of operation is
clear. Reliable troop control is critical as the force commander must be constantly advised
and updated on the situation. Staffs must continuously coordinate actions, plan for future
events, and advise, direct, and assist subordinate units. This coordination, updating,
planning, directing, controlling and staff work is done at the CPs throughout the batdefield.
Referring to the Soviet definition of troop control, it is clear that their Offense in
Depth is a doctrine that taxes the troop control system to its very limits. The rapid tempo
and high maneuverability of forces on the batdefield result in real difficulties in the receipt
and collection of situational information. A staff or commander on the move or under fire
is not as effective in analyzing this information. Subsequently, the decision (recall the need
for decisive action) will be delayed. Disseminating missions to subordinates is also a task
made difficult by the fluid nature and uneven development of the battlefield. Management
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tasks, as in the case of the U.S. CP system, are both more important to success and more
difficult to accomplish as a result of the operational doctrine.
2 . Summary
The existence of echelons in Soviet forces places increased demands on the troop
control system. Echeloned forces must be organized, coordinated, and controlled. The
doctrine requires that each echelon be internally managed, as well as making it necessary to
manage across echelons. Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that each echelon is
made up of different kinds, of forces, resulting in differing internal troop control
requirements.
The battlefield characteristics under the Offense in Depth place tremendous
demands on the troop control process. A battlefield that has rapidly moving forces, and
intense levels of firepower makes continuous receipt, collection, study, etc. of information
both very important and very difficult. Finally, the feature of the need for decisive action
certainly impacts on the troop control system, as it is a function of that system to make the
decisions, disseminate these decisions to subordinates, and monitor the effect of the
decision.
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IV. THE COMMAND POST
The command and control system that a division commander develops to meet the
requirement of maintaining continuous, reliable control is influenced by the sector in which
the division operates, its assigned and on-call missions, and the enemy threat it faces.
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Wetzel
This chapter will discuss the specific characteristics, employment doctrine, activities,
and composition of command posts in both the U.S. and Soviet Armies. The tasks
performed at each CP will be discussed in terms of how they relate to the appropriate
combat doctrine, as well as how they fit into the management model presented in Chapter
n.
.
A. THE U.S. COMMAND POST
For the U.S. Army, a CP is where the tactical commander exercises his command and
control. It is at the CP that critical information is collected, consolidated, processed, and
evaluated. A CP is the collection of personnel, equipment, communications, and
procedures alluded to in the DOD definition of command and control. A CP is where
planning, coordinating, directing, and controlling are accomplished, and where orders are
issued. The main purpose of a CP is to support the commander by providing a framework
to facilitate decision making and management of his forces in batde.
Current Army doctrine calls for the use of three separate CPs. The primary functions
of each coincides roughly with the three areas of operation in the AirLand Batde. There are
common tasks that must be accomplished at all CPs, but each must have characteristics and
capabilities that facilitate freedom of operation, delegation of authority, and the exercise of
leadership from any critical point on the battiefleld.
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A command and control system that is intended to facilitate the flexibility and freedom
of operation required in the AirLand Battle must emphasize certain specific techniques and
command practices. CPs must optimize the use of time by regular use of standard format
warning orders and situation updates. CPs must anticipate plans and the positioning of
forces. The staff must minimize the time cycle used by the commander in his decision
making process. To this end, standardized training of staff practices and procedures will
enhance mutual understanding between leaders and units. Additionally, the CP structure
must provide tactical commanders with flexibility and mobility. The leader must be able to
command from anywhere on the battlefield without being deprived of access to information
or the ability to respond to opportunity. CPs must be able to collect, analyze, and present
information rapidly, and communicate orders, coordinate support, and provide direction to
the forces. Finally, the CP system must have the characteristics of reliability, security,
mobility, speed, and durability.
The three CPs that are required under current Army doctrine are the Main, Rear, and
Tactical CP. Each has specific functions and responsibilities, but there are common traits
and practices. An examination of each CP and how the three fit together to provide the




Conduct the deep battie
Plan future batties
* Secondary functions
Coordinate combat service support
* Characteristics
Functionally organized
Located well to rear
60 to 70 percent mobile
Operated by Chief of Staff
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The primary functions of the Main CP are to synchronize the entire battle,
conduct the deep battle, and plan the future battle. A secondary purpose is to coordinate
service support for the entire battle. The Main CP is located toward the rear and is
functionally organized into cells to enhance and speed coordination (see Figure 1), as well
Figure 1. Division Main Command Post*
as reduce reliance on electrical means for information exchange. Staff cells present include
command, current operations, plans, intelligence, fire support, administration and logistics,
signal support, and CP support. The personnel and equipment in these cells provide the
^SOURCE: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual FM 101-5: Staff Organizations and
Operations . (Washington, D.C., 25 May 1984), p. 8-8.
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tactical commander with the ability to plan, coordinate, and direct all aspects of the AirLand
Battle.
Synchronization of the entire battle means the Main CP directs the command and
control system. The orientation of Main is very broad and all of the functions of
management are performed here. Recendy, attempts have been made to reduce the size of
the Main CP, partially to shift more resources to the TAC CP (see below), and partially to




Conduct the close-in battle
* Secondary Functions
Monitor deep and rear battle






The Tactical CP has the primary mission to conduct the close-in battle. Its
secondary missions are to monitor the deep and rear battles, and plan the future close-in
battle. A characteristic of the Tactical CP is its ability to operate continuously at the
minimum possible size. The Tactical CP features well forward deployment and complete
mobility. The significantly reduced size is reflected by the presence of only command,
current operations, fire support, and CP support cells (see Figure 2). The focus of the
personnel is narrower than at Main, as attention and planning is restricted to the close-in
battie.
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Figure 2. Division Tactical Command Post^
Again, all management functions-planning, organizing, coordinating, directing,
and controlling--are necessary. The more limited scope of activity at the Tactical CP means
that these management functions are essentially restricted to the close-in batde. The
intensity of these management functions is higher, as the pace of activity here is much
faster than at other locations. Additional tasks at the Tactical CP are the development of
combat intelligence, control and coordination of fire support and air defense operations,
and communication of combat support and combat service support requirements to Main.
^SOURCE: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual FM 101-5: Staff Organization and





Conduct rear area operations
* Secondary Functions
Serve as backup to Main
Plan future battie
* Characteristics
Well to the rear
Not very mobile
Orientation on rear battie
The Rear CP sustains the battle and conducts the rear battle. Secondary missions
are to serve as a backup for Main, and plan the future battle. The characteristics of this CP
are that it is deployed well to the rear and is much larger and less mobile that the others.
The orientation of Rear is on the rear battle. This CP is functionally designed the same as
Main, with additional emphasis on support functions and additional staff for rear area
operations.
The responsibility to conduct rear area operations entails execution of
management functions for the rear battle, as well as being responsible for the overall
command and control of administrative and logistic support for the entire battle.
Additionally, Rear must be prepared to function as Main at any time if the Main CP is
relocating or disabled.
The effect of having the three CP structure in tactical operations is to give the
commander the ability to exercise command and control throughout the entire battlefield.
The commander can gather information, assess the situation, make decisions, issue orders,
plan future operations, and monitor results of all aspects of the AirLand Battie at any CP.
The overlap of responsibilities and the distribution of facilities over the battiefield ensure
the timeliness of information and access to the critical point in the battle at all times-
essential qualities of a command and control system.
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Another key characteristic common to all command posts is survivability. In
order to provide the means by which a commander can manage his forces, the CP must be
able to survive. To this end, U.S. doctrine calls for numerous deliberate measures to
enhance CP chances for survival.
Hardening of facilities, either through the use of Engineer equipment, or by
taking advantage of terrain features (hills, caves, etc.), or manmade features such as
buildings can significantly increase CP survivability. Dispersion of the personnel and
equipment in a CP can also help. By designing CPs to function with staff modules,
dispersion can be better achieved.
Duplication is another means to enhance survivability. This refers to both
internal and extemal duplication of work. If specific tasks are performed in more than one
place, the command and control of that task will not suffer if a CP is partially destroyed.
A major tradeoff must be decided upon by the commander, as many survivability
enhancing measures (dispersion, for example) reduce the effectiveness of a CP. The
commander must find the appropriate balance between the factors of survivability and
effectiveness.
4 . Summary
The doctrinal structure that the Army has established for CPs is sound. The
features of redundancy, security, mobility, and durability combine with with functional
breakdown of tasks to provide the AirLand Battle commander with the command and
control support he needs to affect the outcome of battle. It is important to note that in order
to realize the potential offered by the CP structure, the commander must balance CP
survivability with CP effectiveness. A CP that provides accurate, timely, and complete
information but is destroyed in the opening moments of battle is of no value to a
commander. Similarly, a CP that can move rapidly, is well protected, and survives any at-
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tack but provides no benefit in terms of the commander's decision making has no value. A
commander will generally have his CPs set up in a way that he is comfortable with. A
proper balance of survivability and effectiveness characteristics is the key to the successful
deployment of the command and control system in the AirLand Battie.
B . THE SOVIET COMMAND POST
To the Soviets, a command post is "...the basic point from which troop control is
carried out in the time of preparing and in the course of action." [Ref. 3:p. 931 A CP is
where the tactical commander exercises his troop control. It is at the CP that critical
information is collected, consolidated, processed, and evaluated. While a CP is the
collection of personnel, equipment, communications, and procedures alluded to in the DOD
definition of command and control, Ivanov describes the nature of a CP as
...a collective of responsible personnel trained and organized for work and a complex of
technical equipment and the personnel to service it deployed at a particular location or on
the move and specifically intended for command and control in preparation for and
during combat operations. [Ref. 6:p. 96]
A CP is where planning coordinating, and monitoring the execution of missions are
accomplished, and where orders are issued. The main purpose of a CP is to support the
commander by providing a framework to facilitate decision making and to "...ensure firm,
flexible, continuous, and secure command and control (troop control) under any
circumstances." [Ref. 6:p. 96] As in the case of the study of U.S. command posts, the
doctrine for Soviet deployment will be discussed in terms of the military management
model from Chapter 11, and the warfighting doctrine of the Soviet Army discussed in
Chapter HI.
The Soviets feel that in order to be effective, a tactical CP must have the characteristics
of survivability, mobility, and reliability. By finding a balance between these sometimes
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divergent traits, the system of CPs deployed can achieve the operational commander's
troop control goal—firm and continuous control of the force.
Survivability is achieved by the use of a number of different steps. First, the various
CPs deployed in a given area will be properly dispersed such that enemy artillery and/or air
strikes are unable to attack more than one at a time. Internal dispersion also reduces the
likelihood of significant destruction as the result of enemy fire. All CPs are provided with
air defense protection as well as an intemal security force. Facilities within all CPs will be
hardened to every possible extent in order to make each element more durable. In fact,
most CP support organizations include Engineer equipment for this purpose. The
communications equipment is generally remoted from the active CP facilities in order to
separate the control functions from the electronic signature. The duties and tasks that are
performed at each CP will be overlapped so that if an officer is killed or is otherwise
unavailable, another will be able to continue performing that job. Finally, the mission of all
CPs will be overlapped and duplicated, as well. If a CP is destroyed or is in the process of
moving, another CP will take over the tasks being performed. It is not just the facility (the
CP itself) that must survive; it is the control over the force exercised by the CPs that must
survive.
Mobility is another key characteristic. Depending on the battle situation and the size of
the force, a CP may move as many as three times a day. The principle reason for this is to
keep in as close contact with the pulse of the battle as possible--the commander must be at
that point where the fate of the battle is determined. Another reason to continually relocate
is to confuse enemy attempts at the destruction of Soviet troop control facilities. In many
cases, those vehicles with the best high speed and cross country capabilities will be used at
CPs. Since frequent movements degrade the ability to exercise control, additional CPs are
required so that a leap-frogging along parallel routes can be done, ensuring continuity of
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control over the force. Soviets make extensive use of helicopter support of their CPs,
moving personnel and equipment as well as improving information gathering.
Reliability is achieved through the use of extensive backup equipment, particularly
communications equipment. Communications into and out of all CPs are protected through
redundant access by multiple means (radio, messenger, teletype, facsimile, etc.). Control
is reliably maintained through the transfer of responsibility to alternate CPs whenever the
situation warrants such action. Soviets plan these hand-offs of control extensively, and
through the communications capabilities, alternate CPs are completely and accurately
informed of the situation at all times. The internal distribution of responsibilities at each CP
are clearly defined and specified, again to ensure continuity and stability of control.
While the actual specific deployment of CPs is determined by the commander, there
are seven basic types. These are the forward command post, main command post, altemate
command post, rear command post, command/observation post, auxiliary command post,
and airborne command post. For purposes of this analysis, the seven CPs have been
grouped into two categories, based on their functions. This grouping is not part of Soviet
doctrine, but is intended solely for simplicity of presentation.
1 . Principal CPs
The Main command post is the primary point of control for the unit. This is
usually where the commander is going to be located. The Main CP is augmented by
forward and altemate conomand posts, and will be located near the line of contact. The
Forward command post is deployed nearer to the first echelon of troops to enable the
commander to more effectively control the unit. The Altemate command post has a
somewhat reduced staff from the Main and is used to ensure continuity when the Main is
moving or is out of action.
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The functions and missions of these three CPs are virtually the same. Their
composition will be such that operations, intelligence, communications, and pohtical affairs
staff support is available. The commander will always be at one of these three CPs. They
will generally be located from two to four kilometers (in a division) from the line of
contact.3
2. Secondary CPs
The composition of the following CPs are unique as each has a specialized
mission.
The Rear command post (also called the rear service control point) is where the
deputy commander for rear services operates. Here, the rear service support for the entire
unit is organized and controlled. The command/observation post is typically a vehicle such
as a tank. This will be the only form of CP found at units below regiment. The Auxiliary
command post is set up when the situation calls for another CP, such as a major movement
or operation along a second axis. The Airborne command post is used by commanders to
increase their mobility along the line of contact so that operations can be better observed
and controlled.
^ The distances/locations of CPs in any operation is a matter of great importance and concern. Research of
Soviet thoughts in this matter uncovered a number of different ideas. Ivanov (Ref. 6) cites the need to
maintain communications in order to keep troop control intact, so cautions against moving CPs too close
(p. 101). The Soviet Encyclopedia (Ref. 3:p. 108) described placement of CPs with consideration for the
convenience of organizing and maintaining communications, concealment, and accommodating the forces
and means of the staff. The USSR report "Troop Control in an Offensive" (see Bibliography) described
locating only one CP in a division, that at a distance of three to five kilometers (km) from the front, at
least at the outset of the Great Patriotic War. However, experience soon showed the need to improve the
organization of control facilities. The aim became to create opportimity for the commander to have a
prompt and effective response for die situation, resulting in the echelonment of CPs and the distribution of
their missions across the battlefield. The principle lesson learned was that locations of CPs is situation
dependent, such that division Main could be anywhere from less than one to more than eight km from the
contact. Finally, the CASS curriculum at Ft. Leavenworth (Ref. 4) cites much greater distances for all




The activities and number of CPs in any operation is dependent on the mission of
the unit, but basic Soviet doctrine calls for the use of seven separate CPs. The functions of
each are designed to overlap and interconnect in order to provide the Soviet commander
with an accurate picture of the battle, and to ensure firm and continuous control over the
force. There are common tasks that must be accomplished at all CPs, but each must have
the characteristics and capabilities that reflect its primary purpose. The exercise of
leadership from any critical point on the battlefield is a significant feature of Soviet military
theory, to the point that the Main is that CP where the commander is located. In turn,
where he is 'ocated is determined by the situation—he should be at the point where the
outcome of the battle will be decided. [Ref. 6:p. 100]
The elaborate design of the Soviet CP system is meant to provide firm and
continuous control over their forces. By balancing the characteristics of survivability,
mobility, and reliability, they have taken a great step forward in achieving their troop
control goals. Through extensive practice and planning of the difficult act of control hand-
off (from one CP to another) the Soviets may be able to provide the control that is needed.
Both warfighting doctrines place great demands on the system by which the
ground force commander manages and controls his forces. Additionally, both doctrines
increase the need for an effective system of management and control. The U.S. and Soviet
Armies have attempted to design their respective CP system to provide the appropriate
degree of control without obviating the importance of flexibility.
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V. CONCT.TJSTON
No element of (the AirLand Battle) concept is more essential to the development of a
credible warfighting capability than command and control. Command and control has ever
been an essential element in battle. Also, it has always been a very, very difficult problem
to master.
Gen. Donn A. Starry
This study has shown that the current CP systems are vital to today's tactical battlefield
commanders. Modem weapons and the latest combat doctrine place greater demands on
the command posts than ever before. The purpose of this thesis has been to compare the
doctrine of tactical command posts and the CP support of operations or tactical actions
conducted by the U.S. and Soviet ground forces.
To this end, the first step in the analysis was a definition and description of a basic
paradigm of military management. The assumption is that this model accurately reflects the
management of military forces and operations in both Armies, meaning that the functions of
management (planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling) are tasks that
are executed as part of the command and control/troop control process.
The next step in the analysis was a brief description of the two warfighting doctrines.
This discussion included an examination of the implications that these doctrines have on the
command and control systems that are designed to support them, including the demands for
better C2 support and management, as well as how characteristics of the modem battiefield
detract from (sometimes prevent) effective C2.
The final step in this thesis was to discuss the command posts themselves. The
structure of, activities at, and individual missions for each of the command posts were
examined, as was the question of whether these characteristics satisfied the command and
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control/troop control goals in light of the tremendous demands imposed by the AirLand
Battle and the Offense in Depth.
There are both distinct differences and wide similarities in the command post doctrine
currently employed by the ground forces of the U.S. and USSR. The most obvious
difference is in number. While the U.S. plans to use three command posts in support of
AirLand Battle, the Soviet Union describes the need for no less than seven separate CPs to
provide the commander with the needed degree of firm and continuous troop control.
The functional breakdown of tasks at the CPs are generally similar, in that the farther
forward the CP, the narrower its focus and that those CPs deployed farther from the front
were larger, less mobile, and more involved with the administration and logistics of the
unit. (This is an interesting development since both warfighting doctrines rely heavily on
deep attack and strikes against the enemy rear.) Additionally, it was noted that the
functions of management defined in our model were performed at all CPs.
The U.S. doctrine demands a balance of factors of survivability with these
characteristics that enhance the effectiveness of CPs. The Soviets, on the other hand, try to
incorporate survivability, mobility, and reliability to give the CPs the means to achieve their
troop control goals. U.S. doctrine places a great deal of importance on mobility, but only
as a means to achieve survivability. The Soviet's extensive leap-frogging of control from
one CP to another is an aspect not discussed a great deal by the U.S., although in the U.S.
scheme of things as one CP moves, the control it exercises will be at least partially handed
off to another.
Finally, the Soviets have done a much better job of providing precise definitions of the
terms and general concepts that form the basis for command posts. While troop control is
very neatly spelled out in the sense of what it entails and who it involves, the definition of
command and control is more ambivalent and indistinct. The Soviets have also done a
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great deal of work in the study of the process itself, while Americans seem to be enamored
with technology and less inclined to describe processes. This imbalance of definition
(which may imply an imbalance in understanding) is of great importance. The U.S. must
develop a standardized prototype paradigm for the C2 process, with all terms and concepts
clearly defined.
In both the U.S. and Soviet Armies, command and control/troop control is a critical
factor in the success of operations (or tactical actions). The nature of the modem batdefield
requires careful, efficient management of military resources in order to maximize their
effectiveness. How tactical command posts operate, or how they provide the means




The following are terms or expressions that relate to the general topic of command and
control or to command posts specifically.
* Troop Control. [USSR] The activity of commanders of operational level units,
tactical- level units, or chiefs of branches of troops and services, staffs, pohtical
organs, services, and other control organs in time of war on maintaining combat
readiness and fighting capability on troops, preparing operations and tactical actions,
and directing troops for the carrying out of assigned missions. Troop control was
carried out in accordance with the orders, directives, instructions, and troop control
documents of higher commanders and chiefs.
The commander of the operational level unit carried out troop control personally
and through his staff, and also through his deputies and the chiefs of branches of
troops, special troops, and services. On the basis of the decision, orders, and
instructions of the commander of the operational level unit, and also troop control
documents of the higher staff; the staff combined and directed the actions of chiefs
that were subordinate to the commander of the operational-level unit for the solution
of concrete problems of control. [Ref.3:p: 107]
* Control of Combat Means. [USSR] The process of working out and
transmitting influences that control (commands, signals) with the goal of effective
use of combat means in accordance with their purpose and assigned mission. [Ref.
3:p. 96]
(Notice that the Soviets do not consider staff action as a part of the process.)
* Command Post. [USSR] The basic point from which troop control is carried out
in the time of preparing and in the course of combat action. [Ref. 3:p. 93]
* Points of Control. [USSR] Places that have been specifically equipped and
fitted out with technical means, from which an operational-level commander with his
staff officers carries out troop control. [Ref. 3:p. 102]
* Initiative. [U.S.] An offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations.
Subordinates must act independently within the context of an overall plan.
Improvisation and aggressiveness in a subordinate leader. [Ref 2: p. 2-2]
* Depth. [U.S.] Time, distance, and resources. Knowing the time required to
move forces—enemy and friendly. Commanders need to use the entire depth of the
battlefield to strike the enemy and prevent him from concentrating his firepower or
maneuvering his forces to a point of his choice. Depth of resources refers to number
of men, weapon systems, and material that provide tfie commander with flexibility
and extend his influence. [Ref. 2:p 2-2]
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Agility. [U.S.] Rexible organizations and quick-minded leaders who can act
faster than the enemy. Unit should have an appropriate mix of soldiers and
equipment to complete their tasks. Mental flexibility is the ability to think on one's
feet, [Ref. 2:p. 2-2]
Synchronization. [U.S.] Achievement of maximum combat power. An all-
pervading effort throughout the force. Every action of every element must flow
from understanding the commander's concept. [Ref. 2:p. 2-3]
Staff. [USSR] The staff is the basic organ of troop control under combat
conditions and of guiding their exercises, indoctrination, and everyday activities.
[Ref. 3:p. 104]
Staff. [U.S.] The organization intended specifically to be a single, cohesive unit
to assist the commander in accomplishing the mission. The staff is organized to




The U.S. Army first established and published a set of principles of war in 1921.
These principles were based on the work and ideas of British Major General J.F.C. Fuller.
Since that time, the list of principles has undergone extensive review, analysis, and
experimentation. To this day, the principles remain essentially the same as the list
published some 67 years ago [Ref. 2:p. B-1]:
* Objective. Every military operation should be directed toward a clearly defined,
decisive, and attainable objective.
* Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
* Mass. Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
* Economy of Force. Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary
efforts.
* Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible
application of combat power.
* Unity of Command. For every objective, there should be a unity of effort under
one responsible commander.
* Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
* Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time and/or place and in a manner for which he is
unprepared.




SOVIET PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY ART
Soviet military theory is based on what they consider to be the fundamental principles
of military art. While these principles do not represent any great revelation or even a
significant departure from traditional miUtary ideas, it is useful in attempting to understand
the nanire of Soviet military thinking.
Soviets believe their armed forces must [Ref. 5:p. 1-3]:
* Be fully prepared to accomplish the mission regardless of the conditions under
which war begins or must be conducted.
* Achieve surprise whenever possible. Military operations must be characterized by
decisiveness and aggressiveness. Forces must strive continuously to seize and hold
the initiative.
* Make full use of all available military assets and capabilities to achieve victory.
* Ensure that major formations and units of all services, branches, and arms effect
thorough and continuous coordination.
* Select the principal enemy objective to be seized and the best routes for attacking it.
Make a decisive concentration of combat power at the correct time.
* Maintain continuous and reliable command and control.
* Be determined and decisive in achieving the assigned mission.
* Maintain complete security of combat operations.




The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, located at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, has published, in Field Circular 101-55, Corps and Division Command and
Control [Ref. 8], an extensive work on command and control.
Appendices A through E of that publication provide examples and recommendations of
command post structure for a standard corps, and airborne corps, a heavy division, light
division, and an airborne/air assault division.
Each appendix provides the following:
* General Introduction, a brief description of the operation at the CP,
* Authorized Personnel, a presentation of the TOE authorization of personnel by rank,
MOS, and staff section,
* Command Post Configurations, a further breakdown of the personnel
authorizations, this time presented by CP, including the vehicles in which each
person will operate,
* Command Post Diagrams, a scale-model layout of each staff functional module, and
a "site layout" of each of the three CPs
Included in this appendix (as pages 41 through 46) are selected excerpts from FC 101-
105. The reader is strongly urged to read this document in its entirety, as it is arguably the
most comprehensive publication on the subject of hands-on tactical command and control
available.
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APPENDIX A COMMAND PCBT STRUCTURE - STANDARD CORPS
APPENDIX B COMMAND POST STRUCTURE - AIRBORNE COPPS




APPENDIX D COMMAND POST STRUCTURE - LIGJ^T DIVISION D-1
APPENDIX E COMMAND POST STRUCTURE - A I R3 ORN'Z /A I R ASSALLT DIVI3ia,'S E-1
APPENDIX F STAFF BATTLE TASKS F-1
APPENDIX G COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION HEQUIREMENTS (CCIR) G-1
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INTIL ANALYST E3 96510 1 1
TOTAL 15 1 10
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SECTION III. COMMAND POST CONFIGURATIONS
SICTION TITLE
TACTICAL C?

















E SU CDPO'" 'r- £»'='J^^








07 00800 1 K113/M2 VRC-92(2)






A Oi^ 36ACO 1 M577 VRC-90
B ou 37A0O 1





A 04 12AC0 1 M577 it^ 1
B on 11C00 1 VRC-92f2)
A E5 31CZ0 1 GRC-106








A/B oi; i3e:o 2 VTMED
A E6 13F:0 1 3/-T VRC-93C2)
A E5 31C20 1 H»^^V
A/B E4 13F10 2





A 03 1UB00 1 Mn3 - CRC-193A
B E^ 16H10 1 GRC-2 13









































CG 08 OOBOO 1 5T(EXP) VRC-90(3)
AIDE 03 ncoo 1 3/4T(H)
CSM E9 00250 1 Mn3/H2
CH OF STAFF 06 ncoo
SCS OH ^'lC'A2
EXEC ADMIN ASST E6 71C30
EXEC ADMIN ASST E5 71C10
CLERK/TYPIST EH IIMIO -
PER CAR DR EU 19K10
LNO 03 ncoo
LNO 03 12A00
LNO SCT E6 nM30 " 1
LNO SGT E6 19K30
TOTAL l!
CURRENT OPERATIONS
G3 05 ncoo 1 5T(EXP) TCS
G2 05 35AOO 1 3/HT(2) GRC-106
ASST C3 B 0« 12A00 11 5/HT(2) VRC-92(2)
ASST G3 AIR A OH 15A00 11 5/HT(1) VRC-90
ASST G2 (TSO) A 04 35C00
CH OPNS SGT A E9 11850
INTEL SR SGT B E9 96Z50
AERIAL INTEL SCT A E8 96D50 1
SR GSR SGT B E3 17K50 1
G3 AIR OP SGT B E7 IIMHO 1
INTEL ANAL A E5 96B20 1
RADIO OP A EH 05B10 1
RADIO OP B E3 05B10 1
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A fundamental aspect of command and control of military operations is getting the
right information to the commander at the right time. A crucial step in designing a system
to achieve this is identifying the information that is critical to the commander in his effort to
make effective decisions. An effort is ongoing in the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center,
Fort Leavenworth, to identify these information requirements.
Enclosed as pages 48 through 56 is a list of the Commander's Critical Information
Requirements (CCIR) for division level to date. These information requirement lists are
intended to be guidelines, and expectations are that each division commander will fine tune
the list to meet his needs. The important factor is that it is critical for commanders to
identify their CCIR or the command and control system will rapidly become choked with
unneeded information. [Ref. 8]
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(a) Concentration of forces
Courses of action (attack, defend, etc.)
Most proDable course of action/ avenue of
(1) Location of main attacK
(2) Type units and strength



















Capability to rJ.t nigr. value friendly locations
Capability to influence friendly scnene cf 2aneuv«
(b) Special and cccisanaer - selected




1. General (river conditions, significant cnanges)
2. Capability to influence scnene (2h, 3c nrs)
Terrain analysis














5. Ccmmander-sel'ected units/ activities (EW, electronic
intelligence, attacned)
C. Unit status (current and projected)
1. Connander evaluation (ready? - yes/no- if no, wnen yes?)
2. Battle resources
(a) Pacing (critical items) - predicted change in status
(1) Supply (antno; petrolevxa, oils, and lubricants; food)
(2) EW systems, and otner specific to mission
(3) Major weapon systems
(b) Ccmmander selected
3. Personnel
(a) Officer and Key MOS commander selected
(b) Radiation status
^. Mission-oriented protective posture
(a) Current status
(b) Time to remain at current status without missior. degraaation
D. Other frier-dly units
1 . Reserve
^a; Time/ distance factors
(b) Location
(c) Intended use/constraints
(d) Coanander evaluation of status
2. Adjacent units
(a) Location
(b) So nene/ intent
(c) Task organization







A. Rules of engageaent
B. A2c2
(inclu3e3 night corridors, free flight, areas)
C. Coverage (5-di3en3ional)
1. Friendly external to division (hign-to-mediua altitude air
aefenae (HIMAD))
2. Non-divisonal US (HIMAD)
3. Divisional (short-range air defense)
(a) Orgardc
( 1) Unit status
(2) Weapon status
(3) Location of units
{'-i) Priority of support
(b) ADA weapon fire status (tight, hold, free)
D. Eneay air enplcynent tecrj:ique (niraoer of aircraft by type-capaoillty)
E. Coanar.d - selected capability/availability
1. T3;-73







1. Organization for comoat (DS, (^3, GSR)




(c) Anaunition available supply rates
(d) Coamander-selected items/organizations
B. TACAIR ( incluaes all air assets: USAF, USN, USMC , allied)
1. Availability (30 nin, and 1 hr)
2. Nuaoer of sorties/aay




(b) A!,VT?Q-36, AN/T?v-37 (FIKEFINDZR)




2. Scnedule by target/nission
E. Suppression of eneny air aefenses scnedule
1. Priority















2. Objective, axis of advance, boundaries, piiase lines, prepared position
3. Maan supply routes {^GRs)/line3 of conn uni cations
^. Bridging and fording sites
5. Avenues of approach
3. Key terrain
C. Barriers/ ODStacles (>BC areas, minefields, etc.)
1. Friendly
2. Ensriy











1. Capabilities (commander evaluation)




2. Unit status (commander evaluation)
3. Equipnent status (commander evaluation)
B. Engineer
1. Capabilities (commander evaluation unique to mission type)
(a) Attack
(1) Bridging
(2) Breacning Based on: Trooos




2. Personnel status (commander evaluation)
3. Eq-Jipnent status (cosxnanaer evaluation)
C. Signal
1. Capabilities or available uncommitted (divisional)
(a) Missile support element nodes











1. Ccnnanaers eval'iiation of stat'js
2. Significant supply anortages
D. MSR status
E. Current priority of effort
^. Personnel replaceraent priority
2. Equipment replaoeoent priority











A. Mission of higher unit
1. Intent
2. Concept
(a) Scheme of maneuver
(b) Priority of fire
B. Unit mission frocn higner (restated)
1. Incent
2. Concept
(a) Scheme of maneuver
(b) Priority of fire
C. Critical situation alert
1. Target criteria
(1) Naaei areas of interest
(2) Target areas of interest
2. Ccnmanaer-selected special events
(a) Enemy
(1) Inlications of hostilities
(2) Significant changes
(3) Cnanges cf missions and tasks
(b) Friendly
(1) Host nation support
v2) Significant cnanges
3. Use of nuclear/ cnemical fire
(a) In t neater/ area cf operation
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